Descripción
Engel argues that, although the minimalist conception of truth is basically right, it does not follow that truth can be eliminated from our philosophical thinking, as is claimed by some radical deflationists. In particular, he shows that some deflationist views have a definitively relativist and "postmodernist" ring and should be rejected. Even if a metaphysically substantive theory of truth has little chance to succeed, he argues, truth plays a central role as a norm or guiding value of our rational inquiries and practices in the philosophy of knowledge and in ethics.
Detalles del libro
Formato
Tapa dura
Páginas
192 páginas
Idioma
Inglés
Publicado
Sep 18, 2002
Editorial
McGill-Queen's University Press
Ediciones
2 editions
ISBN-10
0773524614
ISBN-13
9780773524613